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The concept of multifunctionality, in which agriculture is viewed as a source of 
both commodity and non-commodity outputs, has stimulated debate on the 
desirability of further trade liberalization. We explore the economics of 
multifunctionality and its policy implications. We argue for a new policy 
approach in which land and natural resource managers are remunerated for 
positive non-commodity outputs and penalized for negative outputs. This 
would require devolution in policy implementation from the centre to the local 
level. Such an approach would permit countries to achieve broader social 
objectives, while at the same time continuing to pursue trade liberalization. 




Editorial Office: 410 22
nd St. E., Suite 820, Saskatoon, SK, Canada, S7K 5T6. 
Phone (306) 244-4800; Fax (306) 244-7839; email: Kerr.w@sympatico.ca           106   D. Blandford and R.N. Boisvert 
Introduction 
T 
he concept of “multifunctionality” refers to agriculture as a multi-output activity 
involving not only commodities, but also non-commodity outputs, such as 
environmental benefits, landscape amenities and cultural heritage, which are not 
traded in organized markets. These have no price, because an individual’s enjoyment 
(consumption) of them does not reduce the quantity available to others, and it is not 
possible to prevent someone’s consumption once the good is available. The existence 
of unpriced agricultural outputs has led to a debate on how to reconcile 
multifunctionality with freer trade. Some argue that free trade will jeopardize public-
good benefits unless appropriate domestic policies are in place. Others believe that 
such policies would simply create trade distortions.  
We argue that attempts to address public-good issues in agriculture within the 
traditional domestic/international trade policy paradigm are doomed to failure. We 
argue for a new approach to domestic policy, which focuses on agriculture’s 
importance as a user of highly valued natural and environmental resources. Such an 
approach can be reconciled with freer trade.  
To accomplish our purpose, we review briefly current multilateral trade policy and 
how it relates to the debate over multifunctionality. We then delve in greater depth 
into the economics of “multifunctionality” and its implications for domestic policy. 
We discuss the relationship between the new policy paradigm and international 
obligations.  
The GATT Agreements and Multifunctionality 
T 
he General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade included a limited set of exceptions 
to the terms of the treaty (Article XX), including measures to protect public 
morals; human, animal or plant life or health; patents, trademarks and copyrights; and 
national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value. The Agreement on 
Agriculture (AoA) goes further by including an explicit reference to “non-trade 
concerns”. Article 13 provides an exemption for domestic support measures that have 
no or minimal trade-distorting effects or effects on production—the so-called “green-
box” categories of support. The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade also 
contains provisions relating to non-trade concerns, specifying a list of objectives for 
which technical regulations are permissible, provided that these are not unduly trade 
restrictive (Article 2). The list includes: national security requirements; the prevention 
of deceptive practices; and protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or 
health, and the environment. 
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A central issue is the extent to which these provisions permit countries to satisfy 
objectives with respect to multifunctionality, and whether such objectives would be 
undermined by further reductions in tariffs, export subsidies, and domestic support. 
The Economics of Multifunctionality 
T 
he acceptance of multifunctionality places greater weight on the non-market 
value of agriculture. We need not agree on every non-commodity output to 
include, but must recognize that there may be some that impose social costs in 
addition to those that provide social benefits. It matters little whether such benefits or 
costs derive from externalities or the public-good nature of the outputs. 
The simplest view of multifunctionality is one in which two or more outputs are 
technically interdependent (Shumway et al., 1984). Originally, the definition of joint 
production focused only on commodities—the classic definition refers to things that 
cannot be produced separately, but are joined by common origin or non-allocable 
input (e.g., wool and mutton from sheep, wheat and straw, or soybean meal and oil).  
This simple view of joint production in fixed proportions is unlikely to apply to 
multifunctionality. Where outputs occur in other than fixed proportions, changes in the 
relative prices of both inputs and outputs will affect the supply of both commodity and 
non-commodity outputs.  
Boisvert has captured the critical aspects of joint production in a simple model 
with two commodity outputs and two non-commodity outputs—(e.g., a landscape 
amenity) and a negative externality (e.g., pollution). Each commodity is produced 
with only two inputs, land and a purchased input—fertilizer. The environmental 
residual might be nitrate leaching. As one applies more fertilizer to a fixed amount of 
land, leaching would increase, as would output. However, if a fixed amount of 
fertilizer were applied to more land, output would rise, but leaching would fall 
because the fertilizer intensity of production would fall. In this case, pollution is not 
generated in fixed proportion with commodity output, but production is joint 
nonetheless. There is no way to disentangle or isolate the separate contribution of the 
purchased input to the production of the commodity and its effect on the resulting 
level of pollution.  
There is substantial evidence that society values landscape amenities, which we 
assume to increase with land in agriculture. However, as land in agriculture increases, 
the smaller is the amenity value placed on an additional unit. Thus, as more land is 
used to expand commodity output, landscape amenity value increases, but again not in 
proportion to commodity output. 
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To summarize, commodity output and pollution increase together and are 
technical complements, but because the environment deteriorates with production of 
pollution, commodity production and environmental quality are technically 
competitive—as one rises the other falls. Since the supply of the amenity increases 
with agricultural output, they are technical complements.  
A Policy Interpretation 
Although this discussion establishes technical interdependence between joint 
commodity and non-commodity outputs, it is only through economic interdependence 
that the policy implications can be addressed. This would require “pricing” non-
commodity outputs through subsidies or taxes. To do so reveals the various 
commodity and non-commodity joint products, technically interrelated for one or 
more reasons, to be economically interdependent. We can also compare direct policy 
intervention to influence the levels of these non-commodity outputs with the indirect 
effects that come through traditional commodity policies. 
Viewed in this way, landscape amenity is an economic complement with 
commodity output: as the price or value of either the commodity or the amenity rises 
(falls), outputs of both rise (fall). Pollution and commodity output are economic 
complements in this sense as well. To reflect the fact that pollution increases with the 
level of leaching, the tax acts as a negative price. Thus, the cross price effects are 
really negative, rather than positive, for these “complements”. Since environmental 
quality improves as leaching is reduced, the commodity and the environment are 
economically competitive. Put differently, as commodity prices increase, agricultural 
output expands, but environmental quality declines. As the tax on pollution increases, 
agricultural output contracts, but there in an improvement in environmental quality.  
If we can set the subsidy on amenities and the tax on pollution at their marginal 
social values, we will obtain the welfare-maximizing Pigouvian outcome for 
internalizing the external benefits and costs of the non-commodity outputs (Spulber, 
1985). The solution aligns with Tinbergen’s time-honored principle: we need at least 
as many policy instruments as there are policy objectives. 
It follows that the equivalent commodity output subsidy to achieve this Pigouvian 
outcome can be identified only if there are no negative externalities jointly produced 
and all positive externalities are produced in proportion only to that particular 
commodity. In reality, these conditions are unlikely to apply. Our analysis underscores 
another conclusion. Unless all multifunctional attributes occur in fixed proportions, it 
is not sufficient to focus only on the most pervasive externality or to combine all 
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external values into a single index or “net” measure (Ollikainen, 1999), especially if 
the index includes items contributing to widely different social objectives. 
In the political debate on multifunctionality, it is often assumed that the 
multifunctional attributes of agriculture are supplied in fixed proportions with 
commodity outputs. By extension, a reduction in commodity output resulting from 
freer trade would lower social welfare once the value of the non-commodity outputs 
are taken into account. The discussion above demonstrates that the existence of such a 
fixed proportional relationship is extremely unlikely and that a simplistic policy 
interpretation is likely to be flawed. A more likely situation is one in which the public-
good attributes of agriculture can be supplied through a range of input combinations 
and outputs and at a range of relative prices. Perhaps of equal significance, to the 
extent that public-good attributes are primarily associated with land use, they may not 
be linked strictly to agricultural activities, and, consequently, ensuring their supply 
may not be linked exclusively to agricultural policy. 
A New Policy Paradigm for Domestic Agriculture 
T 
raditional agricultural policies, with their focus on price and income support and 
on commodity production, have only loosely, if at all, contributed to achieving 
environmental goals and satisfying public preferences for non-commodity attributes. 
Sometimes non-commodity aims have been grafted onto traditional commodity 
policies. A case in point is the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) in the United 
States, which has had as much to do with income support and the costs of government 
price support programs as it has had to do with any strictly conservation aims.  
If multifunctionality is a key aspect of agriculture, it is no longer sufficient for 
national governments to set commodity price supports, hoping for acceptable levels of 
jointly produced non-commodity outputs. Nor is it sufficient to ignore negative 
outputs or to mitigate their effects either through supplementary payments that 
encourage “good practices” or through regulation. With agriculture as the major user 
of natural resources, a policy approach is required that explicitly recognizes the 
industry’s role in the supply of highly valued non-commodity outputs. 
Essential Features of the New Policy Focus 
To realize the desired supply of non-commodity outputs, policy would need to be 
reoriented from an agricultural focus to a natural resource focus. Many countries face 
growing pressures on their natural resources (land, water, and air). The future policy 
agenda for agriculture is likely to be driven by such pressures. The interaction 
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between rural, urban, and suburban economies and populations is critical in shaping 
how natural resources are used. A classic example is the phenomenon of urban sprawl. 
Growth management has been a major issue in Europe since the end of the Second 
World War. Major urban areas in the United States have wrestled with the issue for at 
least the past three decades, and it is of growing concern in smaller population centres. 
The management of natural resources involves the well being of the population as a 
whole, regardless of location. The urban/rural distinction is increasingly blurred in 
addressing this set of policy concerns. 
The new policies must, however, bring into much sharper focus the spatial 
diversity of various non-commodity outputs, be they site-specific, local, area-specific, 
regional, or nationally differentiated. Some areas are less vulnerable to erosion; others 
are better suited for wildlife habitat, the promotion of bio-diversity, or the provision of 
ecological services. The demand for amenities may be stronger around urban areas. It 
would also be rare indeed that one technology or production technique would 
dominate others in all social value dimensions.  
To accommodate such diversity, the new policy approach would require 
devolution in policymaking from higher to lower levels of government.
1 Because of 
geographical specificity, the reorientation of the policy agenda towards resource 
management would tend to shift the focus of policymaking to the local or community 
level. We already see this trend in richer countries. In the European Union, it is 
reflected in the debate over the “renationalization” of policy—the devolution of 
policymaking authority from Brussels to national capitals or regions.
2 In both Europe 
and the United States, environmental policies and programs that involve agriculture or 
farmland retention are legislated and administered at sub-national levels. In the United 
States, the first legislation to promote farmland retention was passed in New York in 
1971. In the intervening years, the other 49 states have followed suit. Many localities 
have policies to provide open space or control the quality of the environment. State 
and local regulations that provide safe drinking water or relate to environmental 
quality are often more stringent than their national counterparts.  
While local considerations may dominate the majority of issues in open space, 
environmental quality, and other natural resource management, some issues transcend 
local boundaries. These range from those that demand regional treatment, for 
example, watershed protection, to trans-border issues, such as global warming, that 
require involvement at the highest levels of government. Higher levels of government 
involvement may also be required for the protection of natural resources that have 
particularly high existence values, such as areas of outstanding natural beauty or 
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national parks, primarily to spread the financial burden of maintaining and protecting 
existing uses. Higher levels of government have an important role to play in the 
financing of policy where public goods are involved, although there would need to be 
some degree of cost sharing in order to avoid “free rider” problems. Furthermore, the 
central government would need to ensure that international commitments were not 
violated by policies implemented at the local level. 
In the new policy paradigm, farmers would be part of a broader class of “land and 
natural resource managers”, toward which policies would be aimed. They would be 
remunerated for their contributions to positive non-commodity outputs or penalized 
for negative outputs. Short of being able to quantify some non-commodity outputs 
such as landscape amenities or identify the source of production as in the case of non-
point source pollution, so that the Pigouvian policies could be applied directly, 
payments would be tied to resource use.
3 Thus, for example, if land were to be kept as 
open space, a payment would be made with no commodity production conditions 
attached, except where use involved negative outputs (e.g., pollution). Resource 
owners would be able to choose how to use the land, within the conditions attached to 
the payment (e.g., land could not be diverted to a housing development or shopping 
centre but could be used for agriculture, as a golf course, parkland, or woodland 
providing that public access were maintained). In the new policy paradigm, 
commodity policy instruments would only be needed where the production of a 
particular commodity resulted in a high social benefit (e.g., paying for the planting of 
trees because of their contribution as a carbon sink). In that case, payments could be 
linked to establishment (investment) costs or use of desirable inputs, or directly to the 
desirable output.  
It has long been known that the transfers provided by commodity policies are 
eventually capitalized into land values (Floyd, 1965). Barnard et al. (2001) estimate 
that roughly 20 percent of the value of U.S. cropland used in the production of 
supported commodities in 2000 was attributable to commodity program payments. 
Analysis of the impact of U.S. commodity programs suggests that landowners capture 
the benefits of payments rapidly by adjusting farmland rental rates (Ryan et al., 2001). 
If the social benefit is directly related to keeping land in agricultural use, it would 
seem preferable to pay the owners of that land directly for such services, rather than 
indirectly through commodity programs, particularly since some of these programs 
encourage the intensification of production. Thus, payments could be targeted directly 
to the desired outcome and production distortions could be reduced. 
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Diversity in Policy Instruments 
Payments based on land may be a relatively efficient means of keeping land in 
agriculture and thus realizing the benefits of the non-commodity outputs of that usage. 
Some degree of conditionality could be attached to ensure appropriate resource 
management. To the extent that this imposes additional costs, these will be reflected in 
a lower net payment to land owners or in the rental rates charged to land operators. 
Payment rates could be adjusted to reflect these additional costs. 
Elsewhere, we may want to borrow policy prescriptions from other venues in 
order to tie payments as closely as possible to specific non-commodity outputs. If 
amenities and cultural heritage are, for example, tied closely to certain types of small-
scale animal agriculture, then payments should be conditioned on maintenance of the 
farming system in much the same way incentives are provided to restore buildings of 
historical significance. If paid commensurate with their social value, these farms may 
benefit more than they would through increases in commodity support and could 
continue to coexist with larger operations. 
The current rethinking of the eligibility rules for the CRP in the United States can 
be interpreted in terms of joint production. If payments capture the net public and 
private benefits of moving land out of agriculture and into sound conservation 
practices, then by Leathers’ characterization (1991), one has successfully severed the 
joint relationship between commodity production and the supply of conservation and 
other environmental benefits. It is now more profitable, or less costly, to produce them 
separately. 
In other cases, net benefits may not be sufficient to sever the joint production 
relationship altogether. Thus, the optimal level of water quality might be sought 
through a tax on the inputs, or through incentives to adopt voluntarily environmentally 
friendly production practices (e.g., Wu and Babcock, 1995; Peterson and Boisvert, 
2000). To deal specifically with not being able to trace the source of groundwater 
pollution, Segerson (1988) describes an economic incentive and monitoring scheme in 
the presence of this uncertainty that eliminates free rider problems. 
Other Issues 
Administrative costs are likely to rise with this redirection in policy. In the United 
States, for example, the need for local involvement might reverse the trend in 
consolidation of county agricultural services. In this new policy arena, there would be 
incentive for coordination with other local efforts to deliver similar services. We also 
know that only part of the knowledge base required to design appropriate policies 
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currently exists. Antle and Wagenet (1995), for example, argue persuasively for the 
need for collaboration across the full spectrum of biological, physical and social 
sciences in setting research priorities and addressing the impacts of agricultural 
technology. The public now demands greater accountability for public objectives and 
the assessment of tradeoffs among economic, environmental, and health outcomes 
associated with agricultural technology. These same tradeoffs are at the heart of 
assessing the contribution of a multifunctional agriculture to a broad spectrum of 
social priorities.  
It may also be that the costs of a change in policy direction will be registered more 
in political terms than in program costs. The debate surrounding the current U.S. farm 
bill is clearly moving legislation in the direction of targeting payments based on 
contributions to conservation and environmental stewardship. With pressures to 
constrain total expenditures, there is concern about the redistribution of program 
benefits away from the most productive agricultural regions toward those with a 
comparative advantage in valued non-commodity outputs.
4 If the redistribution proves 
substantial, the legislators with the courage to embrace this new approach may be 
victims of political fallout. Such fallout could be reduced by paying lump-sum 
compensation for reductions in asset values, particularly land values, resulting from 
the redistribution of program benefits. 
Implications for International Obligations 
A 
 key international issue is the degree to which policy objectives with respect to 
multifunctionality would be undermined by freer agricultural trade. By 
extension, if the pursuit of domestic objectives requires some form of government 
support, what form should that take and can it be reconciled with international 
obligations? 
Currently, four major types of exemption from reductions in domestic support are 
permitted in the AoA. These are: (1) exemptions for blue-box payments (payments 
made under production-limiting programs; exempt from reduction until 2003); (2) 
exemptions for green-box payments, which are judged to be minimally production- or 
trade-distorting; (3) exemptions for payments that are sufficiently small that they fall 
under a de minimis provision; and (4) special exemptions for payments made by 
developing countries. Trade-distorting payments (those that fall in the amber box) are 
subject to reduction. 
If significant reductions were to be agreed in amber-box payments, and in tariffs 
and export subsidies, the ability of countries to pursue domestic objectives by 
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maintaining domestic market prices for agricultural commodities above border prices 
would be substantially reduced. Such policies, which tax consumers in order to 
subsidize agricultural production, have been the mainstay of agricultural policies in 
industrial countries, and the desire to continue such policies could be a major reason 
some countries are arguing strongly for the consideration of non-trade concerns in the 
current negotiations. If such arguments are ineffective, incentives to maintain output 
would have to be provided through other means—in particular, through measures that 
reduce input costs (input subsidies) or subsidize output directly (output subsidies). 
From the perspective of reducing trade distortions, the switch to these alternative 
policy measures has much to recommend it. Since input or output subsidies affect 
supply directly, rather than indirectly through market prices, distortions in 
consumption are reduced (Blandford, 2001).
5 The problem is that under current 
international law, these measures would not necessarily be exempt from reductions. In 
particular, it is likely that output price supports would be classified as amber-box 
measures, since their effect on production and trade would not be minimal. Where 
there are non-priced outputs, such as the public-good components of multifunctional 
agriculture, and these are linked to production, the minimal effect requirement creates 
a serious problem, since some linkage between support and output is necessary to 
correct the distortion that results from incomplete markets. In this sense, there is a 
clear conflict between the domestic objective of correcting a market distortion and 
current international law, which equates policy measures linked to output with trade 
distortions. 
We would argue that when agriculture produces positive externalities or public 
goods, the issue should not be viewed as one of providing “subsidies” to producers, 
but rather of providing the remuneration necessary to bring forth a socially optimal 
supply. The term “subsidy” has often been interpreted in a pejorative manner and used 
as a proxy for “distortion”. The term “producer subsidy equivalent”, popularized by 
the OECD, is an example of such terminology. The newer term—“producer support 
estimate”—while an improvement, does not capture what we are proposing since it 
does not reflect that certain payments are not forms of support, but rather payment for 
services rendered. Neither the term “subsidy” nor the term “support” reflects the fact 
that a payment is being made (remuneration provided) for an unpriced output that has 
social value. 
Terminology is important. If the logic of payment for services were to be applied, 
some of the traditional stigma felt by farmers, such as that associated with being paid 
not to use land for agricultural purposes, might be removed. If such payments were 
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associated with the aim of generating positive outputs, e.g., creation of wildlife 
habitat, farmers might not view them with such disfavour. The problem is that farmers 
have often been expected to supply non-commodity outputs without being paid for 
them, e.g., access to footpaths in the United Kingdom.  
The use of payments tied directly to land rather than to commodity production 
should be more acceptable internationally, even if they are unlikely to be totally 
production or trade neutral. To the extent that the income of farm operators is 
increased by such payments, they may choose to invest more in production activities 
and this will affect output. However, a given level of expenditure on a land-based 
payment is likely to have a smaller impact on the production and trade of a particular 
commodity than the same expenditure on a commodity-based payment.  
In summary, therefore, how would this new policy paradigm relate to international 
obligations and international trade? The shift away from commodity policy would be 
consistent with the move towards freer trade through the WTO. The use of payments 
linked to land use and resulting multiple outputs, rather than to commodity 
production, would eliminate the need for price supports and the trade barriers that 
make these possible. The use of input and output subsidies would affect production, 
but this would be a small price to pay for eliminating major sources of distortion in 
international trade. In order to safeguard the interests of other countries, the criteria to 
be used for resource-based payments, or for input and output subsidies could be 
elaborated and included in an expanded green-box category. It might also be desirable 
to replace the current requirement for notification of such payments to the WTO with 
a formal review requirement for proposed policies and programs (Blandford, 2001). 
This is not without precedent in current international law—the WTO agreement on 
subsidies and countervailing measures contains such a procedure for certain types of 
subsidies. 
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Endnotes 
1.  Gundersen et al. (2001) have made this argument for U.S. agricultural policy. They 
argue that the role of the federal government should be limited to food safety, 
environmental issues that involve several states (e.g., watershed quality), and 
international trade issues. 
2.  In a recent report prepared for the European Commission, a group of experts 
argued for the decentralization of policy making oriented to agriculture in the 
Union, primarily to deal with the diversity of natural resource policy needs in 
rural areas (Buckwell, 1997).  
3.  Peterson et al. (1999) caution that if land is subsidized and the polluting input is 
taxed, an optimal subsidy on agricultural land does not equal the net value of land 
amenities. Thus, results from non-market valuation surveys or other techniques to 
elicit amenity values may not be appropriate for setting the farmland subsidy, 
even if the values are “corrected” to account for the value of pollution generated 
per acre. 
4.  In addition to changing the distribution of payments across types of farm (in 
particular, reducing the amount that goes to large farms), the geographic 
distribution would change from favouring the Midwest, where much of the 
commodity output and commodity support is concentrated, to favouring other 
parts of the United States.  
5.  To the extent that consumption is highly price inelastic and does not respond to 
changes in price, for example, for certain “basic” commodities in industrial 
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